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RECENT DECISIONS
ARBITRATION AND AWARD--LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS--
INJUNCTIONS -ARBITRATOR'S INJUNCTION HELD NOT IN VIOLA-
TION OF SECTION 876-a OF CIVIL PRACTICE ACT. - Petitioners-
employers moved for a court order confirming an arbitration award
which enjoined the respondent-unions from continuing "slowdowns."
Respondents contended that the arbitrator's injunction was unlawful
and that it violated Section 876-a of the New York Civil Practice
Act. The Court of Appeals, affirming the lower court, held that an
arbitrator may issue an injunction and that such injunction does not
violate Section 876-a. Matter of Ruppert, 3 N.Y.2d 576, - N.E.2d
- (1958).
At common law arbitrators derived their jurisdiction over both
the parties and the dispute from the consent of the submitting parties.'
Under the New York arbitration law, the arbitrator apparently re-
tains these jurisdictional powers.2 While no statute expressly defines
the arbitrator's powers, the provisions of Section 1448 of the Civil
Practice Act, making valid and enforcible arbitration submissions and
contracts, suggest the adoption of the common-law concept.3 An
award will not be enforced, however, when the arbitrator is guilty of
evident partiality or corruption, misconduct prejudicial to the rights
of any party, or exceeding or imperfectly executing his powers.4
The Court of Appeals previously had impliedly recognized the
power of an arbitrator to issue mandatory injunctions 5 by upholding
awards containing them.6 The court did not question the equitable
I Dodds v. Hakes, 114 N.Y. 260, 263-64, 21 N.E. 398 (1889) ; accord, Nutt
v. United States, 125 U.S. 650, 653 (1887).
2 See Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 299, 169 N.E.
386, 391 (1929).
3 Section 1448 begins: "Except as otherwise prescribed in this section,
two or more persons may submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators
any controversy existing between them at the time of the submission which
may be the subject of an action, or they may contract to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising between them and such submission or contract
shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
4 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1462.
5 When the Court in the instant case says that it has never confirmed an
award containing an "injunction" but has upheld awards containing "mandatory
injunctions," the distinction must refer to prohibitory injunctions which re-
strain for a period of time, perhaps for the life of the contract, and manda-
tory injunctions which can be obeyed immediately.
6 Matter of United Culinary Bar & Grill Employees, 299 N.Y. 577, 86
N.E.2d 104 (1949), afflrming 272 App. Div. 491, 71 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't
1947) ; Matter of Devery, 292 N.Y. 596, 55 N.E.2d 370 (1944) (mem. opinion),
affirming 266 App. Div. 213, 41 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1st Dep't 1943).
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relief ordered by an arbitrator acting within his powers.7  On the
other hand, a few lower courts have refused to recognize the grant
of equitable powers to an arbitrator by the parties on the ground that
injunctions properly issue from the court's equity powers alone.8
In the case under discussion, respondents first contended that
the arbitrator, in issuing an injunction, exceeded his powers. Their
collective bargaining contract with the brewery owners prohibited
lockouts, strikes, and slowdowns, and provided for an arbitration of
alleged violations within twenty-four hours of the demand for arbi-
tration. This clause did not expressly give the arbitrator equitable
powers.9 The Court reasoned that the agreement for "speedy" arbi-
tration manifested an intent that the arbitrator have the necessary
powers to remedy any violation. The only effective remedy in case
of slowdowns, the Court found, was an injunction. Since the parties
impliedly contemplated equitable relief, the Court held that the arbi-
trator was within his powers in enjoining the union from continuing
the slowdown.
The respondent-union further contended that Section 87 6-a of
the Civil Practice Act was violated when the lower court confirmed
the arbitrator's injunction. 10 This section forbids court injunctions
in labor disputes unless based on certain findings which were not
made by the arbitrator in the present case. Furthermore, it expresses
the public policy of shielding legitimate industrial protest from court
action." But Article 84 of the Civil Practice Act expresses the
7 In the Bar & Grill Employees case, note 6 sitpra, the Court of Appeals
affirmed without opinion the Appellate Division's holding that there was suffi-
cient service of notice to arbitrate. In the Devery case, note 6 supra, the court
likewise affirmed the Appellate Division's holding that the arbitration clause
which allowed the arbitrator to make a "just" disposition of the dispute au-
thorized his issuance of a mandatory injunction.
8 Matter of Pocketbook Workers Union of N.Y., 149 N.Y.S.2d 56 (Sup.
Ct. 1956); Young v. Deschler, 202 Misc. 811, 110 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct.
1951). In the Pocketbook Workers case, the court refused to confirm the in-junctive portion of an arbitrator's award on the grounds that the arbitrator's
order was repugnant to equity. In the Young case, the court confirmed the
award's injunction, but by virtue of its own equitable jurisdiction. However,
in the motion for a court order on an award, § 1461 of the Civil Practice Act
seems to direct the court's powers to granting an order on the exact terms of
a iurisdictionally valid award, and not to adjudicating on the arbitrator's finding
of fact.
9 A clause expressly giving the arbitrator power to award equitable relief
is found in Matter of Devery, 266 App. Div. 213, 41 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1st Dep't
1943): ". . . [T]he Impartial Chairman may make such award . . . which
.may contain provisions commanding or restraining acts and conduct of the
Employer or the Union." Id. at 215, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 295.
10 Matter of Ruppert, 2 M.2d 744, 152 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
11 Laws of N.Y. 1935, c. 477. See also Matter of Tarrytown Rd. Restau-
rant, Inc., 115 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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public policy of arbitrating disputes.12 Thus the Court was pre-
sented with the problem of apparently conflicting public policies.
Where the ability to arbitrate a dispute has been challenged be-
cause of policy considerations, the courts have occasionally disallowed
arbitration. Thus, where the matter of dispute is clearly illegal or
is of such interest to the state that the courts alone should resolve it,
arbitration is denied.3 A lower court, considering the policy conflict
presented in the Ruppert case, concluded that
.. . illegality can result only if it be held that the public policy underlying
Sec. 876-a C.P.A. is such as to preclude the possibility of including the regu-
lation of strikes involving a labor dispute in the area of permissible arbitration.
. . . Concededly, Sec. 876-a C.P.A. is expressive of profound public policy.
That policy, however, is not so commanding as to override the public policy
underlying Article 84, C.P.A.14
The Court in the instant case admits that the court has ordered
this injunction "although not in the sense of the statute." But in
lieu of validating the injunction by holding Section 876-a inapplicable,
the Court presumes the apparent conflict of the policies, one being
injunction under the stringent requirements of Section 876-a and the
other injunction by arbitration, in the area of court action in labor
relations. The Court then resolves the conflict by "harmonizing" the
policies, stating that the parties' voluntary settlement of a dispute
should not be denied them for any reason. Thus, Section 876-a is
ineffectual against the arbitrator's injunction, and the Court allows
to the private tribunal a power it could not exercise itself.
The Ruppert case clarifies the status of, and strengthens the
policy behind, New York's arbitration law. The Court's construction
of the "speedy" arbitration provision as contemplating an injunction
will probably occasion more injunctions in proceedings under similar
12 Laws of N.Y. 1920, c. 275. Matter of Feuer Transportation, Inc., 295
N.Y. 87, 62 N.E.2d 178 (1946); Matter of Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E.
248 (1924) ; Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288
(1921) (declared the arbitration law constitutional) ; Petition of Minasian,
14 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
13 See, e.g., Matter of Western Union Tel. Co., 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d
162 (1949) (a violation of the penal code) ; Matter of Kramer & Uchitelle,
Inc., 288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493 (1942) (a violation of OPA maximum
price). The state's interest in the matter of dispute invalidated arbitration
in Matter of East India Trading Co., 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E.2d 213 (1953)
(dictum) (an award of penalties) ; Matter of Publishers Ass'n of N.Y.C..
280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952) (an award of punitive
damages): Matter of Kingwood Management Corp., 272 App. Div. 328, 70
N.Y.S.2d 692 (Ist Dep't 1947) (the statute violated under the contract in-
cluded the remedy for its violation); Matter of Michelman, 5 M.2d 570, 135
N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (visitation of children); Matter of Hill, 199
Misc. 1035, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (custody of children).
14 Matter of Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc., 103 N.Y.S.2d 23,
27-29 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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clauses. Moreover, aware of this construction, parties to collective
bargaining contracts will better be able to frame the exact results
they want from arbitration.
ATTORNEYS' FEES - FIRST DEPARTMENT CONTINGENT FEE
SCHEDULE-HELD VOID AS CONTRARY TO STATUTE. - Plaintiff-
attorneys sought a judgment declaring invalid Special Rule 4 1 of the
Appellate Division, First Department. The Rule purported to regu-
late the amounts of contingent fees which attorneys may charge in
personal injury and wrongful death actions. The Appellate Division
affirmed the New York Supreme Court holding that, since the Appel-
late Division has no power to enact rules of civil practice contrary to
statute,2 the Rule was void as being in opposition to Section 474 of
the Judiciary Law.3 Gair v. Peck, 139 N.Y.L.J. No. 64, p. 1, col. 1
(App. Div. 3d Dep't March 27, 1958) (per curiam), affirming
6 M.2d 739, 165 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
Contracts for attorneys' fees have always been subject to court
scrutiny.4 In New York, contingent fee agreements are valid pro-
vided they are reasonable according to the circumstances of the case.5
The New York Appellate Division has powers of inquiry into
the activities of attorneys. 6 They may discipline those guilty of un-
professional conduct 7 and regulate the admission of attoi-neys to
practice. 8
Through its general powers of inquiry the Appellate Division has
the power to discipline an attorney if he charges an unconscionable
fee. 9 The unconscionableness of the fee, however, is a matter of fact.
All the circumstances of the case must be considered, such as the
1 1ST DEP'T SPECIAL RULE 4.
2 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 83.
3 Attorneys' fees are to be determined by contract between the parties.
Id. §474.
4 See, e.g., Nesbit v. Lockman, 34 N.Y. *167, 169-70 (1866).
5 Fowler v. Callan, 102 N.Y. *395, 7 N.E. 169 (1886). See also CANONS
OF PROF. ETHICS, A. B. A. 13, which provides that a contingent fee agreement
is valid, provided it is reasonable according to the circumstances of the case.
The canons of professional ethics are entitled to the force of the law in New
York. Cf. Matter of Annunziato's Estate, 201 Misc. 971, 108 N.Y.S.2d 101
(Surr. Ct. 1951).
6 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
7 N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(2). See also note 6 supra.
8 Id. §§ 53, 56, 460-61, 463-70.
9 See Morehouse v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 185 N.Y. 520, 78 N.E. 179(1906) ; Matter of Fitzsimons, 174 N.Y. 15, 66 N.E. 554 (1903).
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